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Abstract 
We examine the tax rules for ownership of fungible securities in light of three 
recent cases addressing this issue, Samueli, Calloway, and Anschutz. We argue 
that ownership has no economic basis under an income tax because under a pure 
income tax ownership would not be needed to measure income. Rather than 
acting as a bedrock principle based in economics, ownership in a realization-
based income tax acts as a default rule for assigning tax characteristics to 
positions. For example, ownership determine characteristics such as holding 
periods, eligibility for special tax benefits such as the dividends received 
deduction, counting toward control or as qualifying consideration for various 
purposes, and so forth. Each of these characteristics, which we label tax attributes, 
is motivated by different policy considerations. Given the wide variety of policies 
behind the various tax attributes, no single concept of ownership can be expected 
to be appropriate in all cases. Therefore, tax rules for each characteristic start with 
the default rule of ownership but modify the assignment of the attribute based on 
the relevant policy considerations. Viewing ownership, as a mere default for 
assigning tax attributes, we propose a simple and clear rule for ownership of 
fungible securities which produces results similar to those of current law and yet 
which avoid the problems created by the recent court decisions on ownership of 
fungible securities.  
                                                 
* We thank Alex Raskolnikov and participants at a workshop at the Washington 
University, St. Louis,  for comments. 
Compare two investments. In the first, you instruct your broker to buy a 
share of stock in a public company, say, IBM. In the second, you enter into a 
derivative contract with a bank that promises to pay you a return identical to the 
stock; you pay an amount upfront equal to the current price, the bank pays you an 
amount equal to any dividends on the stock, and when you want to sell it, the 
bank will pay you its then current value less a brokerage fee. The tax law treats 
you as owning stock in the first case and not owning the stock in the second case. 
Instead, in the second case, you have a mere contract with the bank. 
Now suppose that, in the case where you buy actual stock, you borrow an 
additional share from your broker and sell it short, in a transaction known as a 
short against the box. You are insulated from risk and opportunity, have no net 
dividend receipts, and will be able to receive most of the cash from the short sale 
(because you can use your long stock position as collateral). Two leading tax 
scholars, Ed Kleinbard and Alex Raskolnikov, have written (separately) that you 
continue to own your original shares for tax purposes.1 To our knowledge, they 
correctly describe the law. 
What does it mean to say you own stock in these cases? Ownership 
apparently has nothing to do with whether you are exposed to an economic 
position. The first example shows that you can be completely exposed yet not be 
treated as owning stock. The second example shows that you can have no 
exposure and yet be treated as owning the stock.  
If you thought ownership meant title and possession, you would also be 
wrong. You have neither when you buy stock. As we shall see, in modern 
securities markets, title to most stocks is held by an entity you likely never heard 
of – Cede & Co. You merely have a claim that is very much like a contract right 
against your broker. It is not clear what possession means for something that is 
virtual but whatever it may mean, you don’t have that either. Cede holds the stock 
certificates.2 Ownership for tax purposes means something not related to the 
economics and not based on actual possession or title.  
These puzzles have long intrigued tax scholars, who love conundrums, and 
created opportunities for tax planners, who salivate at the prospect of 
economically identical positions that are treated differently. They have also 
                                                 
1 Edward D. Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless Positions in Securities, 71 Taxes 783 (1993); 
Alex Raskolnikov, Contextual Analysis of Tax Ownership, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 431 (2005). 
2 Given that Cede has both title and possession of most securities, it is a favorite target for 
conspiracy theories about Eastern financial syndicates. Internet searches on Cede are entertaining. 
2 
 
attracted the recent attention of the Internal Revenue Service, and the Tax Court, 
which, in three recent cases has begun a re-examination of tax ownership of 
fungible securities.3 In each case, taxpayers tried to manipulate ownership to gain 
a tax advantage, either by avoiding or retaining ownership while having the 
economics or retaining or avoiding. In each case, the Service challenged those 
claims, and the Tax Court held that the attempts to manipulate ownership were 
unsuccessful. The cases potentially claw back some of the results described above 
by trying to base tax ownership on the economics. Nevertheless, the core results 
we described above appear to remain valid which means that the cases increase 
the conundrums rather than reduce them. 
Motivated by these cases, we reexamine the concept of tax ownership of 
fungible securities and other financial products. We start by trying to carefully 
describe the role that ownership plays in our tax system. As noted, it does not 
appear to be based on economics. This is for good reason. In a pure Haig Simons 
tax system, ownership would be irrelevant as all that would matter is changes in 
value. There is, therefore, nothing fundamental about ownership in an income tax. 
There is no bedrock. As a result, attempts to rely on economic principles to 
determine ownership are doomed.  
Ownership, we argue, functions simply as a default assignment of what we 
call attributes. Attributes are the rules that govern deviations from a pure Haig-
Simons base. The term is commonly used to refer to character and source but we 
mean it more generally. An alternative phrase could be “tax characteristics”. 
Realization and nonrealization are attributes or characteristics. So are the holding 
period, the dividends received deduction or net capital gain on dividends, 
withholding on cross-border dividends, tax exemption for interest, the foreign tax 
credit, the original issue discount rules, treaty eligibility, counting toward control 
tests of various sorts, and numerous other components of the tax computation for 
a position. Attributes are needed when we deviate from a pure income tax. The 
role ownership plays is as an initial, default assignment of attributes; owners of a 
security are eligible for the attributes associated with the security.  
Ownership, however, is merely a default rule for assigning attributes. It 
acts as a starting place and is not what fundamentally matters. Instead, the rules 
for each attribute start with ownership but then reassign the attribute based on the 
relevant policy considerations. For example, when we say someones owns stock, 
                                                 
3 Samueli v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 37 (2009), aff’d, 658 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Calloway v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 26 (2010); Anschutz Co. v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 78 
(2010), aff’d, 644 F.3d 313 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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we mean that only the ownership position is initially assigned the attributes 
associated with stock. We initially assign the dividends received deduction to the 
owner. Sometimes, however, we take away that assignment based on the policy 
considerations. If you hedge your risk from owning the stock, you may lose the 
dividends received deduction. And sometimes we assign contractual holders some 
attributes of ownership, such as dividend withholding because, for policy reasons 
related to those attributes, he should have those attributes.  
This should not be surprising because the policies behind different 
attributes differ. A concept of ownership that satisfies the purposes behind one 
attribute will not necessarily work for other attributes. For example, the purpose 
behind the exemption for municipal bond interest is different from the purpose for 
the realization requirement which is different from the purposes behind the 
dividends received deduction, the foreign tax credit, the OID rules, or cross-
border withholding. There is no reason to expect that a single concept of 
ownership will suffice for all of these different purposes. It would be surprising if 
that were the case.  
Given these observations, we suggest a reformulation of the rule for 
ownership of fungible securities. Our goal is a rule which minimizes the costs of 
assigning attributes. We do this by specifying an ownership rule that gets it right 
for the overwhelming majority of cases and that is simple to understand and 
apply. With a clear ownership rule, attribute assignment rules that deviate from 
the default will then be able to adjust attributes to reflect the relevant policies.  
An initial intuition is that title is the correct default rule. Title may work 
for many assets, but it does not work for street name securities. As we mentioned, 
investors who “own” a street name security do not in fact have title. Title to most 
securities is held by a centralized depository, such as the Depository Trust 
Corporation through its special purpose entity, known as Cede & Co. Possession 
does not work either. If the securities are certificated, Cede holds the certificates, 
so Cede has possession.  
Investors instead have a unique contractual claim called a “securities 
entitlement,” governed under Article 8 of the UCC, which we will describe in 
more detail in Part 3. We propose that for street name securities, the holder of the 
securities entitlement be treated as the owner for tax purposes. For securities not 
held in street name, the titleholder is the owner. For contractual relationships, 
such as most derivative contracts, the contracting parties are the owners of their 
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respective positions. We discuss possible exceptions to these rules such as for 
repo transactions. 
We by no means write on a blank slate. Ownership has perplexed scholars 
for a long time. There are two relatively recent articles on ownership of fungible 
securities that we highlight up front because they have been particularly useful in 
our thinking and because our arguments either use or shed light on the 
considerations discussed in those articles.  
The first is Ed Kleinbard’s article, Risky and Riskless Positions in 
Securities.4 Kleinbard’s article is largely positive, attempting to explain the law as 
of the time he was writing (although he alludes to our argument in a paragraph in 
his introduction).5 He argues that ownership of fungible securities depends only 
on formal title and the ability to dispose of the security to an outright market 
purchaser. The claim is that as long as a taxpayer has title and the ability to 
dispose of the security, he is the owner, even if he has no other attributes of 
ownership, particularly even if he has hedged away all risk of loss and 
opportunity for gain. This approach contrasts with the rules for other types of 
property, where ownership depends in part on having economic exposure to the 
returns from the property. Moreover, Kleinbard argues that if the taxpayer does 
not have title and the ability to dispose, he is not the owner even if he is fully 
exposed to the risk.  
While Kleinbard’s paper is positive and our proposal is normative, our 
proposal would produce results very similar to those he describes and to a great 
extent for the reasons he describes. That is, while we believe that there is no 
fundamental concept of tax ownership (it is not clear whether Kleinbard does), a 
system similar to the one Kleinbard describes is likely a good default rule.6 Our 
key difference with Kleinbard is that we believe that his focus on ownership 
misses the most important part of the transactions he considers, which is how tax 
attributes are assigned not how ownership is determined.  
The second is Alex Raskolnikov’s article, Contextual Analysis of Tax 
Ownership.7 He provides a positive analysis of ownership under the tax law 
(generally, as opposed to just fungible securities). He argues that ownership 
determinations depend on the context, dividing the world between fungible and 
                                                 
4 Edward D. Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless Positions in Securities, 71 Taxes 783 (1993).  
5 Kleinbard at p. 785. 
6 As discussed in Part 3, our proposal depends on Article 8 of the UCC, which was 
amended in 1994, after Kleinbard wrote.  
7 Alex Raskolnikov, Contextual Analysis of Tax Ownership, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 431 (2005). 
5 
 
nonfungible assets and between “when” questions and “whether” questions. With 
respect to fungible securities, Raskolnikov’s description of the law largely mirrors 
Kleinbard’s: ownership of fungible securities in Raskolnikov’s view is based on 
possession and the right to dispose, and of those two, the right to dispose is by far 
the more important. 
We agree that ownership should depend on context but take a somewhat 
different approach by arguing for a formalistic definition combined with rules for 
claiming or receiving the relevant attributes. Like with Kleinbard, our difference 
with Raskolnikov is that we think, by focusing on ownership, he misses the most 
important parts of the transactions he considers. The law should focus more on 
attribute assignment provisions like sections 246(c) and 1259, and less on 
ownership.8 
Before we begin the analysis, we need to clarify an awkward 
terminological point. Our paper is about the proper analysis of ownership for tax 
purposes. Because the term ownership is the variable being considered, using it 
colloquially can create confusion. If we say “consider someone who owns a share 
of stock” the meaning is unclear because we are trying to determine when 
someone owns the stock. Describing simple transactions, such as “owning” a 
share of stock, without using the term is awkward, however. If we say that a 
taxpayer owns a share of stock free and clear, we suspect that everyone will still 
understand what we mean. We try to only use the term when its meaning is 
unambiguous. To the extent that there are ambiguities, we mean ownership in the 
sense of our proposal.  
Part 1 analyzes the role that ownership plays in our current tax system, 
establishing the core of our argument that ownership is a mere default rule for 
assigning of attributes. Part 2 considers the three recent Tax Court decisions. Part 
3 outlines our proposal for determining the ownership of fungible securities. Part 
4 concludes. 
1. Ownership in the tax law 
We develop our thesis by working through a series of examples to explore 
the role that ownership plays in our tax system, focusing on ownership of 
financial instruments. We start with the simplest possible transaction, an ordinary 
investment in a share of stock and compare that to a financial contract that gives 
                                                 
8 Raskolnikov provides an extensive list of articles on tax ownership. See notes 1-4 in 
Raskolnikov. We refer readers interested in the background literature there. 
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the taxpayer the identical economic return. We then turn to more complex 
transactions. The analysis establishes three points: first, that a Haig-Simons 
income tax would not need ownership; second, ownership acts as a default rule 
that assigns tax attributes on an initial basis; third, attributes are subsequently 
reassigned based on the relevant policy considerations for each attribute. 
Ownership and non-ownership are less different than they look at first, and the 
differences and similarities are matters of policy choice about the assignment of 
attributes not something inherent in the nature of ownership.  
Ownership of a share of stock compared to a contractual right  
Suppose that you instruct your broker to buy a share of stock for your 
account. The stock is unhedged, and you get all of the things that one might think 
come with ownership including the economic return on the stock, dividends, the 
vote, and recognition in the market that you are the owner.  
Compare this to a contractual right to the economic returns on the same 
share of stock. There are any number of such contracts available in the market, 
but for simplicity suppose that a financial institution, in return for cash equal to 
the current value of the stock, promises to make dividend equivalent payments 
and, when the you decide to sell the stock, pay you its then current price. Other 
than exposure to the credit of the bank (which, say, is managed through a 
collateral account and which we will ignore in subsequent discussion by assuming 
it is well managed), your rights are identical to those of an ordinary stockholder.  
We tend to think of the first position – buying actual shares – as involving 
ownership of the stock and the second – a contract giving the taxpayer/investor 
the economic return on stock – as not, even though the two positions have 
identical returns.9 The question is what is the difference? What does it mean to 
say for tax purposes that the first position involves ownership of stock and the 
second does not when the two are economically identical? 
Start by noting that the two positions would be treated identically under a 
Haig-Simons or mark-to-market tax for the simple reason that they are 
economically identical. A Haig-Simons tax does not need to determine whether 
you own stock or merely have contractual rights that are identical to owning 
                                                 
9 As we will discuss in Part 3, if the stock is held in street name, the two positions are 
actually both just contractual rights. A nominee has both title to the stock and possession of the 
stock. The nominee enters into a contract with the person we think of as the owner. The contract 
provides for all of the economic returns to the stock as well as the vote. The tax law characterizes 
this contract as ownership of stock even though title and possession are elsewhere.  
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stock. All that matters is the values of the positions which, by assumption, are the 
same. 
Current tax law, however, treats the two positions differently. To get a 
sense of the pattern, consider some examples.  
 The dividends received deduction and net capital gain. One of the starkest 
differences between the two positions is that only an owner of stock can 
receive payments characterized as a dividend for tax purposes, so that the 
payment is eligible for the dividends received deduction or to be treated as 
net capital gain.10 The holder of the contractual right is treated as receiving 
contractual payments, not dividends.  
 Stock for subchapter C purposes. Subchapter C provides numerous rules 
governing transactions involving stock, such as contributions of property 
to a corporation in exchange for stock, sales of stock to the issuing 
corporation, receipt of stock in certain reorganizations, sales of stock of 
controlled corporations to related parties, and so forth. For the most part, 
only actual stock and not contractual rights count as stock for these 
purposes.  
 Consolidated returns, subpart F, and subchapter S. Various tax rules look 
to ownership to determine the status of a corporate entity. For example, 
the consolidated return rules require group members to hold 80 percent of 
vote and value of a corporation to be included in a consolidated return.11 
To be a controlled corporation, subpart F requires a 50 percent ownership 
in a foreign corporation by persons who own at least 10 percent of the 
stock.12 Subchapter S limits ownership to 100 shareholders.13 All of these 
rules, as a first order matter, look to stock ownership, not contractual 
rights. Regardless of how many contractual rights someone buys from a 
bank, they will not be allowed to include the corporation in their 
consolidated return because of the investment. 
                                                 
10 Under section 301(a) and (c), dividends are distributions on stock. Stock is not defined 
but it involves a relationship with the issuing corporation not a third party financial institution. 
Therefore, only the stockholder and not the contractual party can receive a dividend. As we will 
see, however, all street name stock is contractual, so section 301 involves an implicit notion that 
particular types of contractual arrangements are stock and other types are not. Our proposal to treat 
only securities entitlement holders as owners resolves this problem. The dividends received 
deduction may be claimed under section 243 for dividends and not for mere contractual payments. 
Section 1(h)(11) grants net capital gain treatment for certain dividends .  
11 Section 1504(a)(1) and (2). 
12 Section 957. 
13 Section 1361(b)(1)(A). 
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We can see from these examples that ownership is operating to determine 
how to treat particular transactions. We think of this as assigning tax attributes or 
characteristics, such as “eligibility for the dividends received deduction,” “good 
consideration for continuity of interest purposes,” or “counting toward the 
required percentage to be included in a consolidated return.” There are numerous 
attributes because measuring income under a realization-based system is complex, 
because we have a two-level, worldwide corporate tax, and because we try to 
implement a vast number of social policies in our tax system. 
The tax law uses ownership as the basic tool, essentially a default rule, for 
assigning tax attributes because in the ordinary course, it works well. In most 
cases, all of the relevant attributes should move together, so ownership does all of 
the necessary work. We only need to decide who is the owner to decide who gets 
all of the attributes.  
Because it is so commonly used, ownership can be mistaken for the 
fundamental property which determines the assignment of attributes rather than a 
default which is overridden based on policy considerations unique to each 
attribute. In fact, most attributes are assigned on a more complex basis, and as 
transactions and the tax law evolves, the particular rules for assignment of each 
attribute have evolved as well, most often moving beyond mere ownership. 
Consider the following examples.14 
 Section 318. Section 318(a)(4) treats holders of options as holding the 
stock, and it seems likely (although it is not sure) that our contractual 
arrangement would fall under this rule. Where 318(a)(4) applies, the 
contractual right creates aspects of ownership. For example, under section 
302, whether a redemption is treated as a dividend or a sale or exchange 
depends on the redeemed shareholder’s relative ownership of the 
corporation before and after the redemption. For purposes of determining 
ownership under section 302, some contractual rights (or more specifically 
                                                 
14 Rev. Rul. 82-150 is perhaps a counter-example to the thesis because it assigns actual 
tax ownership to a purported non-owner rather than just attributes. The taxpayer in that ruling paid 
$70,000 to purchase a deep in the money option to buy stock of a foreign company for $30,000 
when the stock was worth $100,000. By treating himself as owning only an option and not the 
stock, the taxpayer claimed to be able to avoid the foreign personal holding company rules. The 
foreign personal holding company rules (since repealed) included an option attribution rule (found 
in section 554(a)(3)) but the rule requiring inclusion of foreign personal holding company income 
only applied to actual shareholder. Option attribution, therefore, did not apply to assign the correct 
attributes (the requirement to include foreign person holding company income) to the taxpayer. 




options), are treated as actual ownership by virtue of section 318(a)(4). 
Note that section 318 applies only where specified and is not a general 
rule. Congress has made a policy choice to treat options as ownership for 
some purposes and not others.  
 Other option attribution rules. Rules treating contractual rights as owning 
stock are not limited to section 318. Similar rules can be found in the 
consolidated return rules (section 1504), the subpart F rules (section 958), 
the controlled group rules (section 1563), and the personal holding 
company rules (section 544). Like with section 318, Congress has decided 
that mere contractual rights should be treated as ownership for particular 
purposes and not others. 
 Section 1260. Section 1260 was enacted in response to transactions where 
taxpayers purposefully avoided ownership because they did not want the 
associated attributes. In particular, owners of hedge funds would typically 
receive short-term capital gains in the current year reflecting the rapid 
trading activity of hedge funds and their pass-through structure. Rather 
than owning an interest in a hedge fund, taxpayers would purchase a 
derivative contract on a hedge fund essentially identical to the stock 
derivative described above. The securities dealer issuing the derivative 
would buy an interest in the hedge fund but because dealer used mark-to-
market accounting, the long ownership position in the hedge fund and the 
short derivative position with the investor simply offset, so the dealer was 
indifferent. As a result, taxpayers could convert short term gain included 
currently into long term gain included whenever the derivative was closed. 
Section 1260 attempts to limit the tax benefits of avoiding ownership in 
this fashion but it does not do so by treating taxpayers with mere 
derivative positions as owning the hedge fund. Instead, it assigns some of 
the attributes of ownership to such taxpayers, most importantly 
recharacterizing the gain as short term and imposing an interest charge for 
the deferral.15  
                                                 
15 Section 1260 in its current form applies to derivative positions in pass through entities 
and not positions in stock. The Treasury Department has authority to apply it to derivatives 
positions in stock such as position considered here. To date, no regulations have been issued. 
Tax shelters associated with mark to market accounting by securities dealers often 
manipulate ownership. When enacted, many thought mark to market taxation for securities dealers 
would eliminate sheltering by these entities because their tax would be based purely on their 
economic income. To many people’s surprise, mark to market accounting created tax shelter 
opportunities such as the one described in the text. One way to think about why this happened is 
that ownership does not matter for mark to market taxpayers while it does for everyone else. 
Anytime ownership is associated with tax attributes that are undesirable, a mark to market 
10 
 
 Section 871(m). Section 871(m) was also enacted because taxpayers were 
avoiding ownership, in this case to avoid dividend withholding on cross-
border payments. 16  Rather than investing in stock, taxpayers would invest 
in a swap contract that gave them the same returns as investing in stock.17 
Payments on the swap equivalent to dividends were not subject to 
withholding unlike actual dividends. Section 871(m) treats dividend-like 
payments on certain derivatives as subject to withholding, effectively 
assigning one particular attribute to these payments but not changing who 
owns the underlying stock.  
We can see from these examples that the tax law sometimes treats the 
contractual right as ownership for particular purposes but not for others. 
Ownership is a default rule that we override when appropriate. 
Own but hedge.  
The pattern described above can be seen clearly in the case where a 
taxpayer owns the stock (in the sense of the simple stock purchase considered 
above) but hedges his risk. The classic example is a short against the box 
transaction, in which a taxpayer who owns stock outright borrows identical shares 
and sells them short in the market. The taxpayer has completely eliminated the 
economics of stock ownership because the short and long positions exactly offset. 
He has neither the opportunity for gain, the risk of loss, nor the right to dividends. 
The two positions completely collateralize one another so that the taxpayer is able 
to receive most of the cash from the short sale, thereby not only eliminating the 
economics of the original long position but also giving the taxpayer cash.  
There are numerous other examples which use more sophisticated 
contractual arrangements, enabling investors to better tailor their returns. 
Taxpayers who own stock can be short the stock in a total return swap (and be 
long whatever is specified in the contract), a forward contract, or a deep in the 
money option. They can use costless collars to eliminate a specified portion of 
upside and downside. They can borrow non-recourse against the stock and pair 
                                                                                                                                     
taxpayer can take ownership and use derivative contracts to give the same economic return to 
other taxpayers while avoiding ownership.  
16 Technically the result arose because of the source rules for swaps but we can think of 
the source rules for swaps as differing from the source rules for dividends because of the 
underlying assumption that dividend equivalent payments on swaps are not actual dividends. 
17 See Dividend Tax Abuse: How Offshore Entitles Dodge Taxes on U.S. Stock 
Dividends, Staff Report of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Car Levin Chairman 
(September 11, 2008).  
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that borrowing with the sale of a call option (guaranteeing that the taxpayer will in 
the future sell the stock at a fixed price and giving him cash today). They can use 
“kinked prepaid forward contracts” (which go under a variety of acronyms such 
as DECS) where they receive cash up front and give up variable portions of the 
return in specified ranges in the future. The possibilities are limited only by the 
imaginations of bankers and lawyers. 
In a Haig-Simons or mark to market system, the hedge would not change 
the result. At the end of the tax period, the taxpayer would have gain or loss on 
the change in value of the stock, notwithstanding the hedge. To the extent the 
hedge changes in value, the taxpayer would have gain or loss on the hedge. But 
the fact that the two positions offset and therefore call ownership of the stock into 
question doesn’t affect the results. We only need to know values, not ownership. 
When analyzing these transactions in our non-ideal tax system, however, 
we need to know whether the taxpayer still owns the stock. One approach, taken 
recently by the Tax Court (and discussed in more detail below) is to ask whether 
the taxpayer has the traditional indicia of ownership. We might think of 
ownership as a bundle of distinct rights, such as control, risk of loss, opportunity 
for gain, title, possession, and so forth and ask whether the taxpayer has a 
sufficient number of these rights to be the owner.  
This is the approach used for physical property such as real estate. The 
most famous test is from Grodt & McKay Realty,18 which involved a dispute over 
whether the taxpayer owned cattle. The court used an eight factor test to 
determine the economic substance of the transaction. The factors included the risk 
of loss and opportunity for gain, possession, the obligation to pay property taxes, 
title, how the parties treat the transaction, and whether an “equity interest” in the 
property has been acquired.19  
We suspect that under this approach, a taxpayer engaging in a short-
against-the-box transaction would not be treated as the owner. The taxpayer has 
no possibility of gain or loss, and effectively gives up possession of the stock. 
None of the reasons we might want to have a realization-based system, such as 
liquidity or valuation concerns, apply. There is no economic substance of 
                                                 
18 Grodt & McKay Reality, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1221 (1981). 
19 As we will see, the Tax Court has also used a similar 12 factor test from Dunne v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2008-63. Dunne was designed for stock ownership in a closely held 
corporation. It used similar factors, such as legal title, possession of stock certificates, the 
economic benefits and burdens of ownership, and whether the corporation lists the taxpayer as a 
shareholder on its books and records.  
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ownership left. Were the stock depreciable property in a sale-leaseback that had 
similar economics, there would be little doubt that the purported owner is not 
treated as an owner for tax purposes. Similar considerations, perhaps with 
different conclusions depending in the circumstances, would apply to other 
hedging transactions. 
We say “suspect,” however, because we are not aware that this approach 
has ever been applied to a short-against-the-box transaction. Instead, as Kleinbard 
and Raskolnikov point out at length, ownership of fungible financial instruments 
is normally determined through a more formal analysis, where, if the taxpayer has 
something akin to title and the right to dispose of the financial instrument, he is 
treated as the owner notwithstanding that he has given up all of the economic 
rights.  
There is a perhaps accidental twist in the law which is key to the analysis: 
we treat identical shares of stock (such as two shares of IBM common stock) as 
distinct for tax purposes even though they are indistinguishable. While this rule is 
perhaps a mere historical oddity with no justification, it provides the answer to the 
ownership question in the short-against-the-box transaction (assuming we follow 
the formal approach of assigning ownership to the person with title and the right 
to dispose). The taxpayer in a short-against-the-box is treated as borrowing other, 
identical shares to the ones he owns and selling those. Moreover, the taxpayer can 
always purchase and deliver different shares to close the short sale than the shares 
that he already owns. Therefore, he technically still has title to the shares and the 
power to dispose of them. Hence, Kleinbard and Raskolnikov conclude, the 
taxpayer is still the owner notwithstanding that he has no risk, no opportunity for 
gain, and has effectively cashed out of his position. Decades of tax law confirm 
this conclusion.20 
The focus on ownership, however, misses the most important tax results of 
the transaction. The tax law treats the hedged position completely differently than 
it does the unhedged position. Although this has happened over time and 
somewhat haphazardly, we can think of the tax law as going down the list of 
attributes that comes with simple ownership of stock and deciding how they 
should be treated for hedged ownership. Yes, we can still think of the taxpayer as 
owning the stock, but we make policy decisions about what ownership means in 
this context rather than slavishly granting the same consequences to ownership in 
                                                 
20 See the discussions in Kleinbard, at 789, and Raskolnikov at 440-441. 
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all cases. Consider the following partial list of rules governing the tax treatment of 
hedged stock. 
 Section 1259. Section 1259 taxes gain but not loss on sufficiently hedged 
positions through a constructive sale. The taxpayer is still the owner but 
the attribute “nonrealization of gain” is removed. (Losses are not allowed.) 
The precise contours of section 1259 were based on views about when it is 
appropriate to require realization of gain, not on when it is appropriate to 
treat a taxpayer as no longer owning the stock (because, after all, section 
1259 treats the taxpayer as continuing to own the stock). 
 Section 246(c). Section 246(c) denies taxpayers the dividends received 
deduction if they sufficiently hedge their stock. They are still the owner of 
the stock but cannot claim this attribute.  
 Section 1(h)(11). Under section 1(h)(11), owners of stock may treat 
dividends as net capital gains. If, however, they hedge their risk of loss, 
they may not claim this attribute under rules similar to those that govern 
the dividends received deduction. 
 Section 901(l) denies the taxpayer the foreign tax credit for taxes paid on 
dividends on sufficiently hedged stock under rules similar to those that 
govern the dividends received deduction. 
 Sections 1092 and 1233. If the taxpayer does not already have a long-term 
holding period, sections 1233 and 1092 eliminate the taxpayer’s holding 
period without treating the taxpayer as a non-owner. 
 Foreign taxpayers are still treated as an owner for purposes of determining 
whether dividends on the stock are subject to withholding. 
 Taxpayers are likely treated as owners for purposes of determining 
whether a redemption of stock is treated as a dividend or a sale pursuant to 
section 302 and for most other purposes of subchapter C. 
 Taxpayers appear to be treated as owners for purpose of the consolidated 
return rules.  
It is clear from this list that ownership of hedged stock is treated completely 
differently from ownership of unhedged stock. Many but not all of the attributes 
assigned to owners of unhedged stock are not given to owners of hedged stock. 
While Kleinbard and Raskolnikov are correct that we treat an owner of hedged 
stock as continuing to own the stock, the statement has little functional meaning. 
Ownership is just a default rule for assigning tax attributes that we can and do 
modify as needed. An owner of hedged stock gets some attributes of ownership 
and not others. This is exactly what we should expect because determining which 
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attributes such a taxpayer should get will depend on the policy reason behind the 
attribute.  
Non-ownership: exchange the share of stock for cash 
Suppose that the owner of stock sells it. In general, this is a 
straightforward case of non-ownership. The taxpayer recognizes gain or loss and 
so on. Ownership seems to do the necessary work, and all one needs to do is 
determine whether the taxpayer ceases to own the stock.  
The effects of a sale or exchange, however, are just attributes that we 
govern through various rules beyond ownership. In most cases, the attributes we 
assign to non-ownership are clear and the sale or exchange is sufficient to do the 
necessary work. In other cases it is not. For example, if a taxpayer sells the stock 
and within 30 days repurchases substantially identical shares, the wash sale rules 
treat a non-owner as an owner for purposes of one particular tax attribute, loss.21 
Other attributes are not governed by the wash sale rules. The taxpayer is not an 
owner under the rules under subchapter C during the 30 day period. For example, 
during the period after sale and before repurchase, the taxpayer cannot count the 
stock toward control, the shares do not count as owned for consolidation, the 
taxpayer does not have continuity in the shares for purposes of the reorganization 
provisions, and so on.  
The related party rules are similar. As a general matter, the taxpayer does 
not own stock that is sold to a related party. Nevertheless, the taxpayer is denied 
losses but is taxed on gains. Moreover, the taxpayer is treated as continuing to 
own the stock for some purposes, such as where section 318 applies.  
Securities Loans and Repos 
We close this section with a discussion of securities loans and sale-
repurchase transactions (repos). These transactions, although quite old and central 
to the functioning of financial markets, present challenges to the analysis of 
ownership. For this reason, they are featured centrally in Kleinbard’s analysis and 
we follow his analysis closely.  
Securities loans. Securities loans typically take place as part of a short 
sale. A broker (with the client’s consent) borrows a security from a client’s 
account and transfers it to another client who typically sells it. The borrower has 
                                                 
21 The general wash sale rules are found in section 1091. Section 1092 has a related set of 
wash sale rules.  
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to put up collateral, which can be but is not always cash, and will receive a 
specified return on the collateral. During the term of the loan, the lender is entitled 
to receive payments equal to any dividends or other payments on the security (in 
lieu of payments) as if he were still the owner. When the transaction is closed, the 
security is returned to the lender and he must return the collateral. 
The tax treatment of an almost identical set of flows, documented as a 
cash loan rather than a securities loan, is clear, although the labels are switched 
because the focus is on the transfer of the cash not of the security. In a cash loan 
collateralized by securities, party A receives cash from party B and transfers 
securities to B, to be held as collateral. When the transaction is closed, the cash 
and securities are returned to their original owners. In a cash loan, Party A is 
called the borrower and in a securities loan with the same flows, Party A is called 
the securities lender. The same reversal in terminology applies to B. Once one 
sees the reversal in the terminology, the similarity of the two transactions is 
apparent. In a cash loan, Party A, the cash borrower/securities lender is treated as 
continuing to own the security.  
The problem with treating securities loans like cash loans is that in a 
securities loan, the collateral is normally sold and the person who buys the 
security outright in the market believes himself to be the owner. For cash loans 
secured by nonfungible property, this is not possible; a lender cannot sell a piece 
of real estate being used as collateral for a loan. If the cash loan is secured by 
fungible property such as securities, loan treatment is not a problem as long as the 
lender does not sell the property. If in a securities loan, however, we were to 
follow normal loan treatment on the stock lender side (who would be treated as 
the borrower in a cash loan), there would be two competing claims for ownership 
because both the original owner and the third party buyer would believe they own 
the security. Kleinbard concludes that because of this problem of multiple owners, 
we cannot treat a securities loan like an almost identical cash loan. 
We agree with Kleinbard on this point but it is important to understand 
why the point is correct. Kleinbard argues that while many investors can have 
long positions in the security, there can be only one owner. Having multiple tax 
owners of a single piece of property, however, is not inherently bad. The problem 
with having multiple owners arises because ownership comes with specific 
attributes that we may not want duplicated. For example, if the security is a share 
of stock, we do not want multiple taxpayers to claim the dividends received 
deduction as there has been only a single distribution with respect to the stock 
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and, therefore, a need to prevent double taxation only once. That is, the problem 
the tax law faces with securities loans is attribute assignment. 
The solution arrived at, as codified in section 1058, was to treat the 
securities lender as a non-owner during the term of the loan but to treat the 
transfer and receipt back of the security as nonrecognition transactions. The effect 
is to assign the ownership attributes to the third-party purchaser. If the security is 
a share of stock and pays a dividend, the third-party owner is treated as receiving 
the dividend. The in-lieu of payment received by the stock lender is treated as a 
contractual payment rather than a dividend receipt. There was little choice in this 
assignment of attributes because the third party purchaser likely has no idea that 
the security he purchased was borrowed rather than owned outright.  
Kleinbard further argues from this treatment that securities loans are an 
example of non-ownership. While this is correct if one looks only to the formal 
treatment under section 1058, it misses other aspects of the transaction. For 
example, for purposes of computing unrelated debt-financed income of tax 
exempts, we treat the securities lender as continuing to own the security.22 
Similarly, in lieu of payments are given the same source, character, and treatment 
under treaties as the underlying amounts they represent.23  
That is, we think of section 1058 as addressing the problem of dual 
claimants to certain attributes of ownership. It resolves these dual claims by 
treating the original owner as a non-owner, creating a default assignment of 
attributes. We then modify this default assignment where needed, such as for the 
source rules. 
Repos. In a repo, an owner of a security – most typically a Treasury 
security or other relatively highly liquid debt instrument – needs cash to finance 
its business. It “sells” the security to a counterparty for cash and simultaneously 
agrees to repurchase the security in the future. The repurchase price is set equal to 
the current sales price plus an interest charge for the use of money during the term 
of the repo. Many repos are “overnight” which means that they have a term of a 
                                                 
22 Section 514(c)(8). A number of other rules specify the treatment of payments on 
securities loans for various purposes. For example, section 851(b) clarifies that payments on 
securities loans count as “good” investment income for purposes of the requirement that at least 90 
percent of a regulated investment company’s gross income be investment income of specified 
types. Section 4940 holds that payments received on securities loans are investment income for 
purposes of the private foundation rules. These rules are not as clear as section 514(c)(8) that they 
are overriding the assignment of ownership to the ultimate buyer but they have a similar flavor. 
23 See Treas. Reg. sections 1.861-2(a)(7), 1.861-3(a)(6), 1.864-5(b)(2)(ii), 1.871.7(b)(2), 
1,881-2(b)(2), and 1.894-1(c).  
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single day, but repos can also have longer terms, with the term being either fixed 
or indefinite.  
Repos are classified for tax purposes (and for most other purposes, 
including regulatory and accounting) as secured loans. The original holder of the 
security is treated as continuing to own the security which means that no gain or 
loss is realized on the transfer to the third party or the transfer back from the third 
party. The attributes associated with the security are assigned to the original 
owner, not the third party.  
The flows in a repo are identical to those in a securities loan. The owner of 
a security transfers it to a third party for cash at the start of the transaction and 
transfers the cash (plus interest) back to the third party in exchange for the 
security at the close of the transaction. Nevertheless, securities loans are treated as 
transfers of ownership for tax purposes while repos are not.  
The difference between repos and securities loans has historical roots and 
also relates to the purpose for the majority of transactions. Securities loans are 
typically driven by a desire by a broker to gain access to a security. In most cases, 
the borrower sells the security and, as noted, there is a third party purchaser who 
holds it outright. The purpose of repos is typically dealer financing. A dealer with 
securities needs cash to finance it operations so it uses the securities to obtain 
financing.  Repos are also used extensively by the Federal Reserve to manage the 
money supply. 
The tax difference between repos and securities loans may have been 
driven historically by the difference in intent, but there is a separate policy reason 
for the difference. Historically, repos did not allow the security purchaser to sell 
the security, so there is no third party holder unlike for securities loans. This 
means that there is less of an attribute assignment problem, allowing repos to be 
classified as secured loans without fear that attributes would be taken into account 
by third party holders as well as by the original holder. That is, in the historical 
context (which is no longer the case as we shall see), the attribute assignment 
problem in repos was completely different than the attribute assignment problem 
for securities loans because of the lack of a third party buyer. As between the 
original securities holder or the temporary buyer, it was relatively easy to assign 
the attributes to the original holder in a repo, an assignment that is simply not 
possible for a securities loan.  
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Unfortunately, modern repos no longer have this key feature – no 
rehypothecation of the security – that differentiates them from securities laons. 
Under the standard form contract used for most repos, the repo lender is now 
allowed to sell the securities or otherwise use them in its business (such as repo-
ing them out to obtain financing).24 As Kleinbard relates, the Service apparently 
did not understand this when it issued a number of rulings on the tax 
characterization of repos, and the market did not understand the Service to be 
limiting its repo rulings to transactions that were not how repos actually worked. 
According to Kleinbard, “before anyone noticed, untold trillions of dollars of 
repos had been consummated – and been reported for tax purposes as money 
loans.”25  
If we strictly follow Kleinbard’s and Raskolnikov’s analysis, this latter 
feature has to mean that a repo that allows the buyer to sell the security is treated 
as a sale not as a secured loan; someone else has title and the right to dispose of 
the security. A number of consequences follow. If the transaction happens to 
satisfy section 1058, then the taxpayer recognizes no gain or loss on sale but the 
attributes associated with ownership are assigned to third party market purchaser. 
If the transaction fails section 1058, then the taxpayer will also recognize gain or 
loss on the sale as there will have been a realization event due to the transfer of 
ownership and no applicable nonrecognition provision.26 As we will see, the 
holdings in Anshcutz, Calloway, and Samueli seem to imply that many term repos 
will in fact fail section 1058 which would mean that gain or loss is recognized for 
all term repos that allow the buyer to sell the security.27 While there is no current 
movement toward legislation or regulation on this issue, if the problem of 
multiple owners becomes substantial, we suspect Congress will have to do 
something to address the problem. As will be discussed below, the best approach 
is not clear because the repo market is large and central to functioning of financial 
markets; changes in tax rules that hurt the repo market could be deleterious.  
Conclusions 
The pattern, we believe, should now be relatively clear. Ownership does 
not play a role in a pure income tax as all that matters is value. Our current 
                                                 
24 See master repo agreement.  
25 Kleinbard at 798, 
26 If the repo is less than 30 days, however, loss may be disallowed under the wash sale 
rules, resulting in gain but not loss on a failed repo. 
27 In most cases, however, the gain or loss will not matter as most repos are done by 




income tax uses ownership as a tool for assigning attributes or characteristics, 
such as holding periods, dividend, control, and so on. These attributes are used to 
calculate income and perform the other functions of our tax system. Ownership, in 
this light, acts as a default rule, a convenient start for assigning attributes. Because 
different attributes have different rationales and scope, however, we modify their 
assignment based on the particular context. 
We turn to the consequences of this analysis below but first we describe 
three recent and important decisions on the ownership of fungible securities.  
2. Recent court decisions 
 Ownership issues for fungible securities seem to have been relatively well 
settled and roughly followed the patterns laid out by Kleinbard and Raskolnikov, 
with some statutory modifications since they wrote. Three relatively aggressive 
transactions and the resulting Tax Court decisions, however, have thrown the 
analysis into turmoil. We review the decisions here. 
Samueli 
We start with Samueli, which is only partly about ownership, because it 
came first in time and because its holding on securities loans is needed to 
understand Calloway and Anschutz, which are directly about ownership.  
Samueli appears to involve a complex transaction but its core economics 
were simple. It involved borrowing at short-term interest rates to purchase a long-
term bond. If short term rates went down, the taxpayer would make money and if 
they went up he would lose money. The key tax aspect was that the transaction 
was structured so that the interest on the long term bond was treated as capital 
gain and deferred until realization through the use of a securities loan while the 
interest on the short-term borrowing was immediately deductible as interest 
expense. 
The details are as follows. The taxpayer borrowed $1.6 billion from his 
broker (yes, billion) and used it to purchase a stripped Fannie Mae bond 
(effectively just a zero-coupon, low credit-risk bond). The taxpayer then 
transferred the strip to the broker in a securities loan. The normal securities loan 
documentation was modified so that the taxpayer could not call the strip back 
except on specified dates. The reason for this modification appears to have been 
concerns about liquidity; if the taxpayer called back the strip on short notice, the 
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broker might have had a hard time locating an identical security to return to the 
taxpayer given the size of the transaction.  
The broker put up $1.6 billion as collateral on the securities loan, which 
was used to pay off the margin loan. The fee for the use of the collateral was the 
same as the interest on the margin loan so we can effectively think of the loan as 
still outstanding, just in another form. The taxpayer deducted the collateral fee as 
interest. He treated himself as not owning the strip during the term of the 
securities loan and instead, getting it back with its original basis. When he sold it, 
he reported the difference between the sales price and his basis as capital gain.  
The abuse, if any, in the transaction was the treatment of the gain on the 
securities loan. To use simplified numbers, suppose that the taxpayer has a two-
year zero coupon bond with a face of $100 that will pay $121 in two years. If he 
held the bond, he would accrue $10 of interest income in the first year and $11 in 
the second year. By lending the security and receiving it back immediately before 
the payment of $121, the taxpayer is able to avoid the accrual of interest income 
because, after all, he is not the owner. He then receives it back with his original 
basis of $100. By selling it for $121, he can claim that the time value earnings are 
actually capital gain. By avoiding ownership via a securities loan, the taxpayer is 
able to convert currently included interest income into deferred capital gain. 
The transaction was a real transaction in that the taxpayer made a bet on 
the movement of interest rates. Moreover the taxpayer actually made money on 
the transaction because short term interest rates went down. The collateral fee was 
$40.6 million while the gain on the strip was $50.7 million, creating a substantial 
net gain. For this reason, the government could not challenge the transaction as a 
sham.  
The government’s argument, which was adopted by the Tax Court and the 
Ninth Circuit, was that the securities loan should be disregarded because it 
violated the terms of section 1058 (discussed below). The transaction was 
effectively recast simply as a cash-settled forward contract to purchase the strip.28 
In particular, if the transfer of the strip to the broker was not protected by section 
1058, then it must have been a taxable sale for the collateral put up by the broker. 
The obligation to return the security under the terms of the securities loan was, as 
a result, a forward contract for the purchase of the strip. This recharactization 
                                                 
28 The actual recast was somewhat more complicated. The government and the court 
treated the initial purchase and securities loan as a purchase and immediate taxable sale for the 
purchase price, generating no taxable gain or loss, plus the forward contract. 
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meant that there was no borrowing so the taxpayer could not claim the $40.6 
million interest deduction with offsetting gain in the strip. Instead, the taxpayer 
simply received the net gain as a single amount.  
The government’s argument, and the court’s holding, therefore, comes 
down to whether the transaction met the requirements of section 1058. Section 
1058 imposes three requirements to qualify as a securities loan (plus anything else 
the Service requires by regulation): the agreement must (1) require the return of 
identical securities; (2) require that in lieu of payments be made; and (3) not 
reduce the risk of loss or opportunity for gain of the original holder of the 
securities. The government argued that the fixed term of the securities loan 
reduced the opportunity for gain because the taxpayer could not recall the security 
and sell it for a gain in the event that its price went up.  The Tax Court agreed. 
This approach to securities loans is hard to justify. While this rule is a 
possible reading of the statute, it is not the only one and, in fact, there were good 
textual arguments against it.29 It is not at all clear why term security loans raise 
tax policy problems any different from callable securities loans or term cash loans 
collateralized by fungible securities, neither of which is treated as a taxable event. 
Term securities loans may serve important market functions; if a security is not 
liquid, a borrower may desire a fixed term on the loan to avoid the potential for a 
short squeeze.30 Moreover, the fixed term of the loan seems to have nothing to do 
with the issues presented by the case which are really about avoiding the original 
issue discount rules by avoiding ownership while retaining the economics. As a 
result, taxpayers will easily be able to structure around the court’s approach by 
simply making the securities loan callable, at least for liquid securities.  
The case, on the surface, is not about ownership as neither the taxpayer 
nor the government argued that the taxpayer owned the strip during the term of 
the securities loan. Moreover, the decision was based on a technical reading of 
section 1058, not on ownership. It fits the pattern described in Part I, however. 
The tax benefit in the transaction was the non-accrual of OID on the strip. Had the 
taxpayer been required to accrue OID, the Service would never have challenged 
the transaction. Non-accrual of OID on a strip during the term of a securities loan 
is a result of treating the taxpayer as not owning the strip under section 1058. That 
is the core tax rule focused too much on ownership and failed to make sure that 
the correct attributes were assigned to the taxpayer’s position. A statutory fix to 
                                                 
29 Discuss the section 514 rule which includes a rule requiring callable loans. 
30 Discuss the NYSBA report.  
22 
 
attribute assignment would have far better addressed the transaction than a narrow 
reading of section 1058. 
In one sense, however, the case is a counter-example to our discussion. 
Our claim was that commentators and some courts, by fetishising ownership 
missed the way that the tax law actual functioned in the various difficult cases that 
they analyzed. Here, the tax law did not function properly. It did not assign 
attributes regardless of ownership, as we claim it normally does. It should have.  
Calloway: 
At its core Calloway simply involved borrowing in excess of basis. The 
taxpayer owned appreciated stock. To monetize the value without tax, the 
taxpayer entered into a three-year nonrecourse loan, secured by the stock, in an 
amount equal to 90 percent of the stock’s value. The taxpayer had no ability to 
recall the stock and replace it with alternative collateral during the term of the 
loan. This alone would not likely have been challenged by the government as it is 
clear that borrowing in excess of basis does not result in a realization event.31 
Unlike a normal collateralized borrowing, however, the lender in this case sold 
the collateral.32 The likely thinking behind the sale was that the taxpayer, in 
                                                 
31 Borrowing in excess of basis, without more, does not trigger gain. Woodsam Associates 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 649 (1951), aff’d, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).  
32 The actual facts are considerably messier, and it is not clear from the opinion whether 
the transactions involved outright fraud or simply inadvertent but inconsistent reporting of the 
transaction. The lender, a company called Derivium, was in the business of marketing the 
transaction and was not an ordinary broker or lender. Derivium appears never to have any 
intention of holding the stock, and in fact it sold the stock prior to advancing the proceeds of the 
“loan” and based the loan amount on the sales price. From Derivium’s perspective, the transaction 
looks like an ordinary sale fraudulently documented as a loan. Derivium does not, however, 
appear to have informed the taxpayer of the sale, and in fact sent the taxpayer account statements 
indicating that the taxpayer continued to own the stock. RICO claims by taxpayers against 
Derivium for misrepresentation resulted in a $270 million judgment. 
http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20090228/PC05/302289961 The Justice Department also 
obtained an injunction against Derivium from marketing the transaction. U.S. v. Cathcart, cite 
(N.D.Cal 2009). 
Calloway, however, does not appear to be wholly innocent. He did not include on his tax 
return any of the dividends paid on the stock during the time he says he claimed he still owned it. 
Moreover, when the loan matured, the value of the stock was less than the face amount of the loan, 
so he surrendered the stock rather than pay the nonrecourse loan. Calloway did not include the 
face amount of the loan in the amount realized on the surrender of the stock, contrary to Tufts. 
Therefore, he seems to have taken the position that he did not sell it at the start of the transaction 
but yet did not own it during the transaction and did not have to report the sales proceeds at the 
end of the transaction even though at some point, either at the beginning or the end, he 
unquestionably sold the stock. 
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addition to borrowing against the stock, transferred the stock to the lender in a 
securities loan, making the transfer and the subsequent sale by the lender tax free 
under section 1058.  
The question is whether the taxpayer had immediate gain from the 
disposition of the stock. The Tax Court majority approached the question by 
asking whether the transfer of the stock as collateral and the receipt of the loan 
proceeds should together be recast as a sale under the substance-over-form 
approach from Grodt & McKay. The court looked to whether legal title passed to 
the lender (it did), the parties’ treatment of the transaction (they failed to 
consistently report it as a loan), and the “equity inherent in the stock” (which the 
court held was transferred). The court also found that the taxpayer had minimized 
his risk of loss because of the receipt of the nonrecourse loan proceeds. Although 
the taxpayer had the ability to pay off the loan and reclaim the stock, so that in 
theory the taxpayer had the opportunity for gain, the court treated this as an option 
to buy the stock rather than retention of the upside potential. Weighing these 
factors, the court found the substance of the transaction was a sale, not a loan. 
Finally, the court looked to whether the transaction could be treated as a 
securities loan, effectively making the sale a non-taxable short sale by the lender. 
The court essentially relied on its holding in Samueli that securities loans cannot 
have fixed terms; the three year term meant that the taxpayer did not have the 
opportunity for gain because he could not demand return of the stock so that he 
could sell it for a gain.33 
The problems with the Grodt & McKay approach should be apparent from 
the discussion above and from a brief perusal of Kleinbard’s and Raskolnikov’s 
articles. It is inconsistent with the basic approach used for ownership of financial 
instruments such as stock. As noted, longstanding law holds that taxpayers who 
fully hedge their risk and eliminate their opportunity for gain are still treated as 
owning stock. Rather than a substance-over-form test, the tax law uses a more 
formal approach – title and ability to dispose, for example – to determine 
ownership of stock. While it could be the case that a substance-over-form test 
would be better than a formal approach (although we doubt it), the Tax Court did 
                                                                                                                                     
To a great extent, these facts are distracting because the same or similar transactions 
could have occurred by parties acting in a more straightforward manner. We ignore the messy 
particulars in the text in an attempt to focus on the core issues presented by the case.  
33 The taxpayer in the face of the prior holding in Samueli, argued that the law of 
securities loans pre-dating the enactment of section 1058 applied to make the transfer non-taxable. 
The court rejected this argument.  
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not even acknowledge that its approach would change the law and would likely 
change the tax results of many common transactions.  
Moreover, the formal approach to ownership is reflected in numerous 
provisions assigning tax attributes for hedged positions in stock. For example, 
section 1259, creating a constructive sale for sufficiently hedged stock, implicitly 
assumes that a taxpayer who fully hedges his stock continues to own the stock. 
The provision would not be needed otherwise, and the provision itself only 
creates a constructive sale to create realized gain, not non-ownership. The same 
holds for numerous other attribute assignment rules governing hedged stock, such 
as sections 1(h)(11), 246(c), 901(l), and 1092, all reviewed above. Therefore, 
even if a substance-over-form approach were superior to the formal approach, a 
substance-over-form approach is arguably inconsistent with the statutory rules.34  
Finally, a substance-over-form approach is not needed. If ownership is just 
a default rule for attribute assignment, the particular rules for each attribute can be 
modified if necessary. For example, section 1259 was written so that it did not 
cover nonrecourse loans in excess of the basis of fungible securities. Perhaps it 
should, although we do not take a view on this here.  Assuming it should, there is 
no need to change the ownership rules for all attributes to ensure that taxpayers 
who borrow in excess of basis recognize gain. 
Concurrences by Judge Halpern and by Judge Holmes took different 
approaches. Both judges argued that the test in Grodt & McKay was inappropriate 
for stock. Judge Halpern would have applied the approach described by Kleinbard 
and Raskolnikov, asking whether the lender had the power to dispose of the stock, 
which it did. This automatically creates a transfer, and the only question is 
whether the transfer qualifies for nonrecognition under section 1058, which 
Halpern would have held it did not because of the fixed term.  
Judge Holmes would have instead relied on the rule in Treas. Reg. 1.1001-
2(a)(4) that a nonrecourse loan is discharged by a sale of the collateral. While 
similar, the results under this approach could differ because the lender obtained 
the power to dispose of the stock the day before it actually did so. Halpern would 
have created a realization event when the lender obtained the power to dispose 
                                                 
34 One may add that many of the Grodt & McKay factors are simply inapplicable to 
stock. For example, stockholders do not commonly pay property taxes on stock there is no deed to 
stock, and it is not clear what an “equity interest” in stock is. As we will note, stockholders 
typically do not have title and possession of stock. Judge Holmes makes these points forcefully in 
his concurrence.  
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while Holmes would have created a realization event only on the day of the 
disposition.  
While both concurrences avoid the problems with the majority opinion, 
both raise serious problems. Halpern’s opinion amounts to the assertion that the 
transaction was a failed stock lending because the taxpayer did not have the 
ability to demand the stock be return. As discussed above, it is not at all clear why 
fixed term securities loans should not get the same treatment as callable securities 
loans.  
Holmes’s opinion creates a problem any time a taxpayer lends margined 
securities. In particular, if a broker borrows margined securities from a customer’s 
account and they are sold short, Holmes’s opinion would tax the transaction. 
Section 1058, which normally treat this as non-taxable would not apply because 
Holmes’s approach creates gain from the discharge of the liability not from the 
sale of the stock. Holmes even implies that this same result holds for recourse 
obligations. If true (we are not sure this would be correct even under his general 
approach), it would create problems for many repos.35 If the repo is treated as a 
secured lending and the security is sold (as it often is), Holmes’s approach taxes 
treat this as a discharge of the liability. 
Overall, none of the approaches taken by the judges on the Tax Court is 
satisfactory. The technical approaches, those by Halpern and Holmes, have 
serious problems because they are either easily avoidable or create unnecessary 
collateral damage. The transaction in this case was simply sloppy, and better tax 
shelter provider could have avoided the problems raised by the technical 
approaches. The majority approach attempts to avoid these problems but 
introduces even worse issues because it uses a test that is wholly inappropriate to 
the context.  
The reason all of the approaches are unsatisfactory is that they focus on 
ownership foot faults rather than the real concern raised by the transaction. The 
concern raised by the transaction is that nonrecourse borrowing in excess of basis 
is a way to obtain all or almost all of the benefits of a sale without triggering 
realization. That is, the problem is akin to section 1259; it is really one of 
deciding when a taxpayer has done enough to trigger realization of gain not 
                                                 
35 See note 15 in Calloway. Repos appear to be recourse to the borrower. See ___. The 
issue is whether a sale of collateral discharges a recourse obligation. We are not aware of authority 
that treats this as discharge if the borrower remains primarily liable.  
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whether the taxpayer is still an owner. Perhaps the Tax Court judges were not free 
to revisit the rule that allows nonrecourse borrowing in excess of basis,36 so they 
were left deciding the case on other grounds.  
Anschutz 
Anschutz is simply the high-rent version of Calloway. In both cases, the 
taxpayer hoped to effectively borrow against the value inherent in appreciated 
stock and eliminate much of the risk of ownership, while deferring tax. The 
mechanism in Anschutz, although it involved a bunch of complicated sounding 
derivatives, was essentially the same as the mechanism in Calloway. The taxpayer 
entered into a series of identically structured transactions using different shares of 
stock. In each case, the stock was sold under a prepaid variable forward contract 
(a PVFC, defined below), pledged to a third party collateral agent as collateral for 
the taxpayer’s obligation under the PVFC, and transferred by the collateral agent 
to the buyer under a share-lending agreement (SLA). The three steps of the 
transaction were interdependent and incorporated into a master contract.  
Under the PVFC, the taxpayer received cash equal to 75% of fair market 
value of the stock transferred. The PVFC had a maturity date of 10 to 11 years.37 
At maturity, the taxpayer was obligated to deliver a number of shares contingent 
on value at that time. The number of shares to be delivered was set so that the 
taxpayer received the first 50% of the appreciation during the life of the 
agreement gave up any appreciation above this amount. Under Rev. Rul. 2003-7, 
PVFCs generally fall outside of section 1259’s constructive sale rules. 
Under the master contract, the taxpayer was required to pledge to a 
collateral agent the stock sold under each PVFC. The collateral agent, in turn, was 
required to lend the stock to the taxpayer’s counterparty under the SLA. Under the 
SLA, the taxpayer received a “prepaid lending fee” equal to 5% of the value of 
the borrowed stock. Thus, the total amount of cash received by the taxpayer at the 
beginning of the transaction equaled 80% of value of the stock (75% under the 
PVFC and 5% under the SLA).  
The SLA allowed the counterparty to dispose of the stock, which it did 
almost immediately.38 The SLA provided for a complicated payout schedule 
                                                 
36 Woodsam, note _.  
37 The term in the particular transaction in Anschutz was set to avoid gain recognition 
under section 1341. Similar transactions entered into by other taxpayers had different terms. 
38 The borrowed shares were used to close out short positions the counterparty had taken 
immediately prior to entering into the transaction with taxpayer. The initial short sales were used 
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regarding dividend equivalent payments that “effectively transferred to [the 
counterparty] approximately 83%-88% of both the risks and rewards of the 
dividend payments associated with the pledged shares.”39 Under the SLA, the 
taxpayer retained no voting rights in the pledged shares. Finally, the SLA 
provided the taxpayer with the right to recall the pledged shares. However, if the 
taxpayer exercised this right of recall, the taxpayer would be obligated to repay a 
pro rata portion of the 5% prepaid lending fee. The record on appeal stated that 
“under most scenarios” recalling the shares would “not be economically rational 
because of the cost,” a finding perhaps a tiny bit at odds with the facts of the case, 
seeing as the taxpayer actually did recall the stock.”40 
The taxpayer did not report any gain from the transaction, taking the 
position that the transaction was not a current sale under section 1001 and not a 
constructive sale under section 1259. The Service disputed the taxpayer’s 
characterization and argued that the transaction was a current sale (and in the 
alternative, a constructive sale).  
The Service supported its current sale argument with an open-ended 
twelve-factor test for determining whether a transaction transfers the 
accoutrements of stock ownership. The Service contended that the SLA was not 
protected from gain recognition by section 1058 because it “did not conform with 
industry standards” and was not the type of liquidity-promoting stock loan 
Congress sought to promote by passing section 1058.41 
The Tax Court held for the Service. In the Tax Court’s view, the PVFC 
and SLA were “clearly related and inter-dependent” and thus had to be considered 
together.42 The Tax Court attempted to determine the substance of the transaction, 
applying a facts and circumstances test from a case called Dunne. Dunne involved 
stock ownership but used factors similar to the Grodt & McKay factors. Using this 
test, the Tax Court found that the taxpayer had transferred “the benefits and 
burdens of ownership,” including legal title, all risk of loss, “a major portion” of 
the opportunity for gain, the right to vote, and possession.43 Moreover, the Tax 
                                                                                                                                     
to set the FMV of the stock for purposes of the transaction. It isn’t clear why the counterparty 
insisted on making the SLA part of the agreement (rather than hedging its risk by, for instance, 
keeping open its short position in the market). 
39 Anschutz, 664 F3d at 328, quoting from the record on appeal. 
40 664 F3d at 328. The Tax Court wrote the stock recall off as an attempt to impress the 
tribunal with the legitimacy of the agreement. See 135 T.C. at 106 (“[T]he recalls were 
accomplished only the influence the tax analysis.”) 
41 See 135 T.C. at 100. 
42 135 T.C. at 105. 
43 See 135 T.C. at 105-06. 
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Court held that the transaction did not qualify for nonrecognition under section 
1058 because the upfront 75% cash payment limited the taxpayer’s risk of loss 
and thus violated section 1058(b)(3). Taxpayer did manage a small victory 
regarding the amount of gain recognized in the transaction. The Service had 
argued that taxpayer must recognize gain equal to 100% of value, but the Tax 
Court disagreed and required the taxpayer recognize gain only to the extent the 
taxpayer received cash payments.44 Finally, the Tax Court held that the PVFC was 
sufficiently kinked to avoid constructive sale treatment under section 1259, 
relying on Rev. Rul. 2003-7.45 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed on essentially the same grounds.46 In 
considering whether the transaction was a current sale, the Tenth Circuit recited 
the eight-factor Grodt & McCay test relied on by the majority in Calloway (but 
not mentioned the Tax Court’s opinion in Anschutz). The Tenth Circuit agreed 
with the Tax Court that the transaction did not qualify for nonrecognition under 
section 1058. The Tenth Circuit pointed out that in addition to reducing the 
taxpayer’s risk of loss (and thus violating section 1058(b)(3)), the transaction did 
not provide dividend equivalent payments as required by 1058(b)(2).47  
The problems with the opinions in Anschutz are the same as the problems 
in Calloway. It is hard to understand how to apply a multi-factor test developed 
for physical property to fungible securities. Moreover, doing so would potentially 
over-turn well-established results and would be contrary to the basic approach 
taken by current law of using attribute assignment rules to determine the tax 
consequences of transactions in fungible securities rather than ownership. While 
the courts may have felt that the taxpayer in Anschutz should have had to pay tax 
on his gain given how he monetized the value and reduced risk, the approach 
taken in current law is to look to specific gain recognition rules, such as section 
1259 rather than to inquire about ownership.  
Said another way, perhaps section 1259 is unduly narrow and the taxpayer 
should not have been able to avoid it so easily. But given that it says what it says, 
it is hard to see how treating Anschutz as no longer owning the stock is the right 
approach given that a taxpayer in a short-against-the-box still owns the stock. 
Even though the taxpayer lost, the basic opportunity remains.  
                                                 
44 See 135 T.C. at 108-09. 
45 See 135 T.C. at 109-13. 
46 See Anschutz Company v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 664 F3d 313 (2011). 




While one may have differing views about the proper outcome of these 
cases, it is apparent that the approach that they take to reaching the outcome is 
misguided. The court focused on ownership when the problems with the 
transactions are elsewhere. In Samueli, the problem is the failure of OID rules to 
tax term loans of an OID instrument. This problem has nothing to do with section 
1058, which the court relied up for its holding. In Calloway, the flaw was the 
ability to borrow in excess of basis without tax. Other than the close to fraudulent 
facts surrounding the case, the facts are essentially the same as in Woodsam and 
the result no more offensive. In Anschutz, the flaw, if any, is the limited scope of 
section 1259 as well as the ability to borrow in excess of basis. It is hard to see 
how the transaction creates less of an ownership interest than a short against the 
box so deciding it based on ownership seems to miss the point. Instead, the 
relevant question for the court should have been whether section 1259 covers the 
transaction and for policymakers, whether the scope of section 1259 is 
appropriate. In all three cases, we can adjust the rules for tax attributes – OID, 
gain for borrowing in excess of basis, and 1259 – and not worry about ownership. 
The Tax Court may have felt constrained because it believed it could only 
use the full ownership-hammer rather than the scalpel of correctly assigning a 
given attribute. Perhaps one way to prevent this from happening in the future it to 
allow the courts to ensure correct attribute assignment without altering ownership. 
This might be done through particular attribute rules – a given attribute rule may 
include discretionary language allowing a court to use judgment – or globally. 
The Tax Court then, for example, could have decided that the OID rules apply to 
lent Treasuries, producing the correct result in Samueli without changing 
ownership more generally, and similarly for the relevant attributes in Calloway 
and Anschutz. 
All three cases also rely on a narrow reading of section 1058, a rule 
designed for attribute assignment in stock loans. Perhaps the Tax Court judges 
can be defended as mere scribes reading the statue and doing their job. Section 
1058 just says what it says, and if Congress doesn’t like it, they are welcome to 
change it. But this view has real problems. First, the reading of the statute by the 
Tax Court is unrelated to basic policy behind 1058 and is not mandated by the 
language of section 1058. Section 1058’s construction of stock loans as involving 
non-ownership and nonrecognition are simply ways of ensuring attribute 
assignment. Lending transactions regularly have restrictions of the sort seen in 
these cases, so hard to see why they would trigger gain in the stock loan case 
30 
 
merely because of the mechanics of attribute assignment used in section 1058. 
Second, the Tax Court’s reading of section 1058 creates problems because 
existing practice is contrary to the rule in the cases.  
3. Proposal 
The basic claim in the discussion so far is that ownership is simply a 
default rule for assigning attributes. Because the various attributes have different 
policy considerations, however, there is no reason to expect same assignment 
rules to work for each one and in practice, attribute assignment rules override the 
default rule and do so with considerable variation. 
Given this structure of ownership – that it is just a default assignment of 
attributes – we suggest that the rule for ownership should minimize the costs of 
assigning attributes. To this end, we propose that a tax ownership for fungible 
assets that gets the assignment correct for the overwhelming majority of cases and 
that is clear, so that when attribute assignment rules deviate from the default, they 
do so based on a known-background rule. The rule that best achieves this follows 
the rules for legal ownership. As we will discuss, for street name securities, this 
no longer means title because of the use of street names. It means a UCC Article 8 
securities entitlement. Where this ownership rule produces inappropriate results 
for some given attribute, the rules governing that attribute should override the 
default rule. This is similar to the approach described by Kleinbard and 
Raskolnikov, modified to take the street names into account (and with the strong 
emphasis, not found in those articles, that ownership is just a default for assigning 
attributes). Our proposal would reverse parts of the decisions in Calloway and 
Anschutz.  
We first discuss the rules for legal ownership, then consider how they 
would apply in the tax context, and finally turn to repos and securities loans.  
Legal Ownership – Securities Entitlements48 
Before turning to the legal framework for ownership, it is important to 
understand the mechanics. The key distinction in current law is whether a security 
is held directly or indirectly. If the security is held directly, the old distinctions 
                                                 
48 Much of our summary is taken from Sandra M. Rocks and Carl S. Bjerre, The ABCs of 
the UCC, Article 8: Investment Securities (ABA, 1997), which contains a fuller discussion. 
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between certificated and registered securities remains. Most securities, however, 
are held indirectly, through brokers, clearinghouses, custodians, and nominees.49  
When a typical investor “purchases 100 shares of Microsoft” through a 
broker, the investor does not become the title owner of the stock. Instead, the 
investor receives a set of rights that look more like a contractual claim against his 
broker than property (although, as we describe below, there are property-like 
features). Typically the broker also holds the stock indirectly and therefore, only 
has contractual claims against someone else. The direct holder of many publicly-
traded shares of stock is Cede & Co., the partnership nominee for The Depository 
Trust Company (DTC), a New York-based organization that provides clearing, 
settlement, and custodial services. Cede & Co typically holds a “jumbo 
certificate” to the shares and is the registered owner of the shares on the issuer’s 
books. DTC credits shares, by book entry, to the accounts of banks and stock 
brokers that hold shares indirectly through DTC. The banks and brokers in turn 
credit the accounts of downstream intermediaries or, finally, the investors at the 
end of the chain.50 
When one investor sells shares to another in the market, the stock 
certificate remains with Cede & Co. DTC and the other securities intermediaries 
simply debit and credit their book accounts as appropriate.51 The underlying 
security—and the direct rights against the issuer that come with it (voting and 
distribution rights being the two most important)—remain in the same hands. 
Since security intermediaries will often receive both buy and sell orders from their 
clients, trading orders are netted. The intermediaries shuffle their book accounts 
to reflect the trades. One entitlement holder’s rights are extinguished as another 
entitlement holder’s rights arise. 
UCC Article 8’s 1994 revision was motivated by the desire to provide a 
legal framework for the commercial practices just described. One of Revised 
Article 8’s chief innovations was the concept of a “security entitlement.” Security 
entitlement is simply the name given to “the core of the package of rights of a 
                                                 
49 In 1994, it was estimated that between 60% and 80% of public securities were held 
indirectly. See Prefatory Note, Proposed Final Draft (April 5, 1994), UCC Revised Article 8. 
Investment Securities, 2. Presumably the percentage is even higher today. 
50 See Sandra M. Rocks and Carl S. Bjerre, The ABCs of the UCC, Article 8: Investment 
Securities, 9 (ABA, 1997) (including a diagram that illustrates the indirect holding system). See 
also Prefatory Note, Proposed Final Draft (April 5, 1994), UCC Revised Article 8. Investment 
Securities, 2. 
51 See Rocks and Bjerre at 47 (including a diagram that illustrates the mechanics of such 
a sale in the indirect holding system). 
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person who holds a security through a securities intermediary.”52 Thus, the person 
purchasing 100 shares of Microsoft purchases a securities entitlement, not the 
stock itself. Securities entitlements are an invention of the Article 8 drafters and 
do not conform to common law contract or property systems. Instead, the 
meaning of the term is “to be found less in any specific definition than in the 
matrix of rules that use the term.”53 
The most important component of that matrix of rules is the set of five 
duties Article 8 imposes on a securities intermediary with respect to its 
entitlement holders.54 First, the securities intermediary must maintain financial 
assets corresponding to the security entitlements of its entitlement holders. 
Second, the securities intermediary must obtain dividends or other distributions 
made by the issuer, and pass those distributions on to the entitlement holder. 
Third, the securities intermediary must exercise rights with respect to the 
underlying security (such as voting or conversion rights) at the direction of the 
entitlement holder (who is free to delegate this power). Fourth, the securities 
intermediary must comply with orders by the entitlement holder, for instance to 
transfer or redeem the security. Fifth, the securities intermediary must act at the 
entitlement holder’s direction to change a security entitlement into another form 
of holding (for instance by causing a certificate to be issued to the former 
entitlement holder), or to cause the financial asset to be “transferred” to a 
securities account with another securities intermediary (transferred is in quotes 
since no actual transfer takes place; the securities intermediaries involved simply 
adjust their books to reflect the new indirect holding arrangement).  
Under Article 8, the basic rule for when a person acquires a securities 
entitlement is very simple. A person acquires a securities entitlement when a 
securities intermediary credits a security to the person’s account.55 A person 
holding a securities entitlement is known as an “entitlement holder.” Section 8-
503(a) elevates the entitlement holder’s rights in the underlying asset, providing 
that interests in the underlying asset held by the securities intermediary are held 
“for the entitlement holders, are not property of the securities intermediary, and 
are not subject to claims of creditors of the securities intermediary.” As noted 
                                                 
52 Prefatory Note, Proposed Final Draft (April 5, 1994), UCC Revised Article 8. 
Investment Securities, 6. 
53 Id. 
54 See Rocks and Bierre at 48–56. 
55 See UCC § 8-501, prefatory note at 7. 
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above, the securities intermediary must comply with the entitlement holder’s 
entitlement orders.56 
An entitlement holder wishing to transfer his interest in the underlying 
security (that is, a typical public shareholder wishing to sell his shares) has two 
options. One option is to instruct the securities intermediary (such as his broker) 
to engage in the transaction and make the resulting changes to its books and 
records to reflect the transaction. Once the intermediary has found a buyer, the 
shareholder’s entitlement would be extinguished and a new securities entitlement 
would be created on the books and records of its intermediary. This process is 
known as originating an entitlement order.57 The second option is to transfer the 
securities entitlement itself, which would require the shareholder to locate a buyer 
and then instruct the intermediaries to transfer the entitlement.58  
Tax Law Ownership 
We propose the simplest possible default rule for ownership. For 
indirectly held fungible securities, the test for ownership should be simply 
whether the taxpayer holds a security entitlement in the security (and is not acting 
as a securities intermediary). If so, the taxpayer is the owner of the underlying 
securities for tax purposes. If not, the taxpayer is not the owner. For directly held 
securities, the test should be title. If the security is registered, the owner is the 
registered owner. For bearer securities, the owner is the person legally holding the 
securities. Finally, for non-security financial instruments, such as derivative 
contracts, neither party should be considered to own the reference security for tax 
purposes; each party should be considered the owner of its contractual rights 
against the other party. 
The tax treatment of everyday investments would be unchanged by these 
rules. Most people consider themselves owners of the securities that they buy and 
are unaware of Article 8. Our proposal would treat them as the tax owners, as they 
are treated now. The treatment of hedged ownership would roughly follow the 
results described by Kleinbard and Raskolnikov. In particular, hedging, even 
perfect hedging, would not generally cause a change in ownership. Shorts-against-
the-box, for example, would not result in a change in ownership (although they 
would result in gain realization).  
                                                 
56 See UCC § 8-507. 
57 See UCC § 8-102(a)(7) (defining “entitlement order”); UCC § 8-507 (providing the 
securities intermediary’s duty to comply with entitlement orders). 
58 In 1996, Prof. Schroeder wrote that transferring a securities entitlement was “unusual” 
in the context of repos. 
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The most important change from current law would be that the portions of 
the Calloway and Anschutz that looked to multi-factor ownership tests based on 
risk, return, and other factors would be overturned. (We will say more about the 
treatment of securities loans in those cases below.) Instead, ownership in those 
fact patterns would be determined based on who has the securities entitlement. In 
both cases, it appears that the taxpayer’s securities entitlement was extinguished, 
so tax law ownership would be transferred as well. 
To illustrate how our approach would apply, we consider a series of 
examples. We focus our discussion on indirectly held securities because most 
transactions now use this form. The treatment of directly held securities is similar 
and somewhat more straightforward because transfers involve actual transfer of 
legal title.   
Unhedged ownership. In the most basic example, a taxpayer buys and sells 
shares of stock through a broker. Under Article 8, the taxpayer acquires a security 
entitlement when a broker credits shares to the taxpayer’s account. Tax ownership 
coincides with the security entitlement so it continues for as long as the taxpayer 
continues to hold the security entitlement. When the taxpayer decides to sell its 
shares, it can either originate an entitlement order to that effect or transfer its 
security entitlement directly. In the ordinary case, the taxpayer originates an 
entitlement order (e.g., clicks “sell” on the broker’s website). Completion of the 
sale extinguishes the security entitlement, terminating ownership for tax purposes. 
Other than being more precise about the mechanics of the transaction, our 
proposal is uninteresting in this context and does not change current law. 
Precision about the mechanisms of securities markets, however, raises two 
issues that almost everyone would have thought were non-issues under any 
sensible tax system. The first is that transferring a securities entitlement from one 
intermediary to another technically extinguishes the original securities 
account/entitlement with the old broker while creating a new securities 
account/entitlement with the new broker. This would seem to create a realization 
event. Second, converting a securities entitlement to a directly-held security, 
which is permitted under Article 8 extinguishes the securities entitlement, again 
creating a realization event.59 Neither of these events would seem to be an 
appropriate occasion for recognition of gain or loss (or other tax consequences 
from a sale, such as starting a new holding period). Section 1036, which provides 
for nonrecognition of gain or loss on exchange of common stock for common 
                                                 
59 See Article 8-508.  
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stock in the same corporation, covers some of these exchanges but most likely 
needs to be expanded. (We do not quite understand how current law avoids these 
problems, although perhaps vagueness about what ownership means allows 
current law to pretend the problem does not exist.)60 
Hedged ownership. Where the taxpayer holds a security entitlement but 
hedges its economic exposure through a short against the box or forward contract, 
current tax law is somewhat uncertain as to whether the taxpayer remains the 
owner of the security, especially after Calloway and Anschutz. Under our 
proposal, the taxpayer’s overall economic exposure would be irrelevant to 
ownership. What matters is whether the taxpayer retains his security entitlement. 
As long as the taxpayer retained his security entitlement, he would remain the tax 
owner of the security. If the taxpayer transfers his security entitlement or causes 
the security entitlement to be extinguished, he would generally cease to be the tax 
owner. Thus, a short-against-the-box would not affect the taxpayer’s ownership. 
Similarly, a total return swap, where a taxpayer holds a security entitlement (or 
held stock directly) and accepts a cash payment in exchange for the taxpayer’s 
obligation to make dividend equivalent payments and a subsequent payment 
based on the stock’s change in value would not affect ownership.  
Hedging ownership might be an appropriate occasion to collect tax on 
gain or loss (and/or to alter the taxpayer’s various other tax attributes). We would 
make this determination through rules designed for the particular attribute at stake 
rather than by treating the taxpayer as no longer owning the security. For 
example, section 1259, perhaps expanded or narrowed as necessary, would 
govern whether gain is recognized when a taxpayer hedges its ownership. Section 
246(c) would govern whether a taxpayer is entitled to the dividends received 
deduction for hedged ownership. Once it is clear that ownership is not capable of 
doing the necessary tax law work, these provisions might have to be reexamined 
and their scope extended as appropriate. 
This approach would overrule the approach followed by the Tax Court in 
Anschutz. A forward contract would affect ownership only if the taxpayer ceased 
to hold a securities entitlement in the underlying shares. Under our approach the 
ownership discussion in Anschutz would have focused solely on the mechanics of 
                                                 
60 Prior to the decision in Cottage Savings, it might have been the case that there was no 
material difference in having a securities entitlement against one intermediary as compared to 
having the entitlement against another. Cite. Cottage Savings would appear to change that rule 
because there is no question that the different securities entitlements are different legal 
entitlements as the counter-party is not the same.  
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the collateral arrangement. Whether, and to what extent, the delivery schedule for 
a forward contract is “kinked” would not be relevant to tax ownership. Kinks in 
the delivery schedule might well be relevant to whether the taxpayer is tagged 
with certain tax attributes—but that is a different question. 
In Anschutz, the master agreement required the taxpayer to pledge the 
shares to a third party collateral agent who was required to loan the shares to the 
taxpayer’s counterparty (DLJ). The case reports state only that the shares were 
“delivered” to the collateral agent, transferred to DLJ, and used by DLJ to cover 
short sales. The case does not indicate whether the shares were held directly or 
indirectly, but the distinction does not matter. By transferring the shares, the 
taxpayer ceased to own them. Assuming the shares had been held indirectly, the 
transfer must have been the result of an entitlement order and have extinguished 
the taxpayer’s security entitlement. When the taxpayer subsequently exercised its 
right of recall, it acquired a new security entitlement.  
The taxpayer in Anschutz, therefore, ceased to own the stock. Whether this 
is an appropriate occasion for the recognition of gain would depend on two issues. 
First, the transfer of the stock might be treated as a nonrecognition transaction 
under section 1058 or a possibly revised and expanded section 1058. (We discuss 
this below, where we consider the taxation of securities loans and repos under our 
approach to ownership.) Second, even if it is a nonrecognition transaction, it 
might be treated as a constructive sale of the taxpayer’s position in the stock (the 
taxpayer no longer owns the stock but would be treated as having a position in the 
stock) under section 1259 or a revised version of that provision.  
Long non-ownership. Options and other financial products such as 
exchange traded notes allow taxpayers to take an economic position similar to 
actual ownership of a security without actually owning the security. Under our 
proposal, such a taxpayer would not be considered the tax owner of the 
underlying security unless and until the taxpayer holds the security directly or 
holds a security entitlement in the security. Constructive ownership rules, such as 
option attribution rules and section 1260 would apply, as appropriate, to treat 
derivative owners as having particular attributes.  
Our approach would overrule the holding in Rev. Rul. 82-150. Rev. Rul. 
82-150 treats a taxpayer with a deep-in-the-money option to purchase stock as 
owning the stock. The motivation behind the ruling was that the option attribution 
rules of the (then) foreign personal holding company rules did not work 
effectively. The Service, as a result, resorted to treating the taxpayer as the full 
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owner; it could not simply ensure that the correct attributes (inclusion of foreign 
personal holding company income) were assigned.  
The Service’s approach, we believe, is a mistake. The issue presented by 
the transaction was a narrow one, of ensuring that the taxpayer could not avoid 
the foreign personal holding company rules by using an option. The issue 
involved the assignment of a single attribute. The Service instead assigned 
ownership for all purposes, potentially overturning the approach used elsewhere 
in the tax law.  
The IRS recently issued a general legal advice memorandum (“GLAM”) 
holding that a hedge fund holding rights under “a contract styled as an option” in 
a basket of securities should be treated as the tax owner of the underlying 
securities.61 The contract allowed the hedge fund to determine the contents of the 
basket of securities. The hedge fund took the position that it owned an option, so 
that there was no realization event when it changed the underlying basket and as a 
result, when the option was finally terminated or sold, it would have long-term 
capital gain or loss. Had the hedge fund traded the securities directly, it would 
have had short-term capital gain or loss included currently.  
Under the actual facts of the GLAM, the foreign bank appears to have held 
the basket of securities in a brokerage account for the hedge fund. If this is true, 
the hedge fund might have been the securities entitlement holder, in which case it 
would be the owner under our test. If, however, the option were just a general 
contractual arrangement with the bank where the bank hedged its position 
generally (say netting its short position in particular securities in the contract with 
other positions in its portfolio), the bank would not be the owner. The tax problem 
in this case is that section 1260 is effectively limited to constructive ownership of 
pass-through entities. To the extent that the government thinks that the taxpayer in 
this case should have short-term gain or loss, it should extent section 1260. 
Loans of cash secured by securities One way of monetizing a position in a 
security is to pledge the security as collateral for a cash loan. If the loan is non-
recourse, it protects the borrower against the risk that the security will decline in 
value (so that non-recourse borrowing is really a subset of “hedged ownership,” 
discussed above). Under our proposal, whether such a transaction amounted to a 
disposition would depend simply on whether the taxpayer had given up its 
security entitlement in the security. Whether the taxpayer gives up its security 
entitlement depends on how the lender’s security interest is structured. 




Articles 8 and 9 of the UCC provide different ways of taking a security 
interest in “investment property” (an Article 9 defined term). Perfection can be 
accomplished by filing or “control”—with perfection by control taking priority 
over perfection by filing. A taxpayer can give the lender “control” over the 
security while remaining the entitlement holder. A party that has been given 
control may order the securities intermediary to dispose of the security without 
the consent of the entitlement holder.62 Under such an arrangement, however, the 
securities intermediary would remain obligated to comply with the taxpayer’s 
entitlement orders. Thus, a lender seeking even greater protection might demand 
to hold the security for the term of the loan. In this case the taxpayer’s security 
entitlement would be extinguished; the taxpayer would be left with only a 
contractual right to receive equivalent securities upon repaying the loan. 
Under our proposal, the taxpayer has disposed of the security in the last 
arrangement because the taxpayer ceases to be the entitlement holder. (In the 
other cases, the taxpayer remains the entitlement holder so there is no 
disposition.) It may not, however, be appropriate to trigger gain or loss even in the 
last case as the parties likely view it as simply another version of a secured 
lending. Normal commercial arrangements of this sort are likely to fit under our 
proposed expansion of section 1058 discussed below.  
The taxpayer in Calloway entered into a transaction styled as a non-
recourse loan, but the Tax Court held that the transaction in that case constituted a 
disposition of the stock. The Tax Court’s majority opinion used an eight-factor 
analysis to reach its holding. Under our proposal, only one factor would be 
relevant: whether the taxpayer had given up its security entitlement in the 
security. The taxpayer in Calloway issued an entitlement order to transfer its 
shares, so would be considered to have terminated his ownership of the shares 
under our proposal.63 Whether the taxpayer could claim that the disposition was a 
nontaxable securities loan is something we take up immediately below. 
Repos and securities loans.  
As noted, repos and securities loans have effectively the same cash flows 
but are treated differently for tax purposes. A repo is treated as a secured loan 
while securities loans are treated as dispositions that are granted nonrecognition 
                                                 
62 The Article 8 language is unclear here as it refers only to purchasers.  
63 135 T.C. at 30 (“On or about August 9, 2001, petitioner instructed Brian J. Washington 
of First Union Securities, Inc., to transfer 990 shares of IBM common stock to Morgan Keegan & 
Co. and to credit Derivium’s account.”). 
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treatment. The historical difference seems to have been based on the market 
practice for repos that the lender retain the repoed securities and also the normal 
purpose behind the transaction. Financial markets have pushed the two 
transactions closer, particularly by eliminating the requirement that the same 
securities lent be returned in a repo. Modern repos allow the buyer to sell the 
securities and to return only equivalent ones. If, for this reason, modern repos are 
to be treated like securities loans, however, the recent Tax Court restrictions on 
section 1058 may make them taxable dispositions.  
We consider here how securities loans and repos would be taxed under our 
proposal and examine the possibility of a unified regime for governing these 
transactions. Under our proposed ownership rule, ownership follows the 
entitlement holder, so the default treatment of both securities loans and repos 
would be as dispositions. The question is when this default treatment should be 
changed for each particular attribute that may be relevant. Our main goal is to 
suggest possibilities not to propose particular details; a full consideration of the 
policy details for each attribute would take us too far afield. We want to show 
how viewing ownership as simple default is consistent with reasonable treatment 
of common market transactions. 
Before we begin, we should note that the background law is not fully 
coherent. Forward purchases of assets always involve an interest element in that 
they are economically equivalent to a current purchase plus a loan of the purchase 
price. For example, if a taxpayer agrees to purchase an asset currently worth $100 
for $121 in two years, there is an implicit 10 percent rate of interest being charged 
for the deferred receipt of the money. It is effectively a two year loan (offset by 
the use value and storage costs of the property, if any, during the term). 
The tax law as a general matter respects the form of forward contracts and 
does not impute interest on time value of money component.64 The tax treatment 
of securities loans and repos depends on the tax treatment of forward contracts 
because they both involve an obligation to repurchase in the future. We cannot 
hope to fully rationalize the treatment of securities loans and repos when the tax 
treatment of forward contracts is not coherent. An important reason is that if a set 
of rules provides the desired tax treatment of securities loans and repos, taxpayers 
                                                 
64 This can be particularly problematic when a corporation enters into a short contract on 
its own stock. Because section 1032 exempts gain or loss on a corporation’s own stock, the 
implicit interest is not taxed. This can be combined with a borrowing to finance the position, 
generating deductible interest expense and nontaxable interest income. The IRS decided to bless 
this arbitrage in Rev. Rul 2003-97 for reasons that escape us. If there is one tax law change that 
comes from this article, it should be the revocation of this disgraceful ruling.  
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can always step outside these rules to get the background tax rule. There will 
almost certainly be discontinuities in the tax rules and a reasonable amount of 
electivity. Our approach, therefore, is to carve out a set of transactions where it is 
important that they be classified appropriately with the knowledge the falling into 
that set is to some extent voluntary.65 
To set the stage, consider an example. The first taxpayer, call him X, is the 
holder of a securities entitlement, so he owns them for tax purposes. X transfers 
the entitlement to a third party, Y, in exchange for cash and simultaneously the 
parties agree that the securities will be returned and the cash plus an interest 
charge paid back. Y may be restricted in its use of the securities, as in a classic 
repo, or may be able to rehypothecate them, as in a securities loan or a modern 
repo. If Y sells the securities, he sells them to Z who holds the securities 
entitlement and likely has no idea that X exists and is exposed to the economic 
risk from the securities. Z may now lend the securities to W terms and W may sell 
them to V and so forth, creating a chain of positions in the securities. Only the 
ultimate holder, say V, has the securities entitlement. 
The place to start is with classic repos, where the purchaser of the security 
must hold the securities or identical securities. While repos with this restriction 
may be a small portion of the market, it may be appropriate to allow people to 
elect into this treatment by restricting rehypothecation. If there is no right to 
rehypothecate the securities, there are only two possible claimants to the attributes 
associated with the security, the original holder, X, and the new holder, Y and 
both parties are aware of the relevant transaction (i.e., there is no third party 
entitlement holder). We can, therefore, follow the traditional authorities and treat 
the transaction as a secured loan, assigning the attributes associated with 
ownership to the original holder X. 
We can achieve this result by reaffirming the existing repo rulings, 
perhaps with the clarification that the purchaser must hold identical securities 
during the term of the transaction. Alternatively, we can provide a specific safe 
harbor through regulations, legislation, or perhaps a revenue procedure detailing 
the circumstances when this treatment is available. An alternative approach that is 
more consistent with treating ownership as a default rule based on securities 
                                                 
65 An example of this from the accounting treatment of repos is Lehnman Brothers’s use 
of a “repo 105’s”. The accounting rules classified a repo as an on-balance sheet borrowing if the 
borrower promised to repurchase the security at a price between 98% and 102% of its value. By 
selling a security worth $105 for $100 and promising to repurchase it shortly thereafter, Lehman 
purposely failed the 98% limit, allowing it to treat the repo as a sale rather than a loan.  
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entitlements is to treat the purchaser as the owner but have a set of attribute 
assignment rules that gets to the same place as the existing rulings on repos.  
Modern repos and securities loans present more of a challenge because if 
Y, the new holder of the securities entitlement can transfer it to a third party Z, Z 
will hold the securities entitlement and will inevitably claim the attributes 
associated with ownership. Z would believe himself to be the outright owner of 
the security and would likely be unaware that X owned the security previously 
and that X will eventually own identical securities. There are at least two possible 
approaches. The first is to follow existing repo treatment, treating the transaction 
as a secured lending, but ensure that attribute assignment is done correct. The 
second would be to follow existing securities loan treatment but ensure that the 
scope of this treatment is appropriate. 
If we treat these transactions as secured loans, we would override our 
default ownership rule because X would be treated as the owner notwithstanding 
that he does not hold the securities entitlement. This would create two owners of 
the same security. This is not, however, a problem if we make sure that the 
attributes associated with ownership are properly assigned. If the attribute is one 
where it is important to assign only once, such as dividend treatment or tax-
exempt interest treatment, there is little choice but to assign it to Z. Therefore, X 
would have to be denied these attributes notwithstanding treatment as a secured 
loan. If it is an attribute than can appropriately be assigned twice, such as the 
source of payments in the security, loan treatment does not create any problems. 
While secured loan treatment would change the characterization of 
securities loans (effectively repealing section 1058), the overall treatment would 
be similar to current law. Under current law, taxpayers treat the interest charge on 
the collateral as creating interest deductions and inclusions and this treatment 
would be continued if securities loans were treated as secured loans. Similarly, 
current law has a complex set of attributes rules for in lieu of payments and these 
would be retained even if the transaction were treated as a secured loan; as 
always, attributes can be assigned independently of ownership based on the 
policies behind each particular attribute.66 
                                                 
66 One important difference is that the result in the transaction in Samueli would be 
different. The taxpayer would be treated as still owning the strip so the taxpayer would have to 
accrue OID, as appropriate. This treatment, of course, could be provided even if a section 1058 
approach similar to current law were used by requiring OID accrual on loaned debt instruments. 
Indeed, the NYSBA report suggests exactly this modification to current law. Cite.  
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Like with classic repos, treating these transactions as secured loans is a 
break from the normal rules for ownership and the normal treatment of forward 
contracts. We would, therefore, need to place parameters around this rule. In 
particular, we would want to ask when a deviation from the normal rules is 
appropriate. It is an exercise in line drawing between loan treatment and forward 
sale treatment.67  There will be a discontinuity anywhere the line is drawn. The 
goal is to find a place where the discontinuity in the tax treatment least distorts 
transactions. 
Regardless of where the precise lines are drawn, it seems hard to justify 
the restrictions imposed by the courts in Samueli, Calloway, and Anschutz.68 In 
particular, there would seem to be no reason why transaction with a fixed term 
would not be allowed. A fixed term does not change the interest component of the 
transaction which arises because of the cash flows not whether they are fixed in 
time. A fixed term would also not likely affect the appropriate assignment of 
attributes, (although if it is important for a given attribute, the rules for that 
attribute can be modified as needed). There have been suggestions that fixed 
terms be allowed for securities loans for only a modest time period, such as three 
months, reflecting market practices.69 It is not clear why there would be such a 
limitation given that loans may have a fixed period of many years. 
There would also seem to be no reason why the original holder, X, could 
not hedge his exposure to the security, contrary to a broad reading of the holding 
in Anschutz.70 There is no reason in general why taxpayers should not be able to 
hedge the risk of a security merely because they have also used it to secure a loan. 
It is conceivable that a section 1259-like rule would use as one factor whether the 
taxpayer has received cash or other consideration because the realization rule is in 
part based on liquidity considerations but the precise scope of such a rule should 
be based on the relevant considerations behind it (i.e., the reasons for realization 
and the economic costs of realization).  
An alternative approach would be to expand section 1058 to treat modern 
repos as securities loans. The same basic considerations would apply. The 
approaches (loan or expanded section 1058) would merely be the technical means 
                                                 
67 See Weisbach, Line drawing articles.  
Mention repos to maturity and repo 105s? 
68 The restrictions in those cases related to section 1058, of course, but the broader policy 
question applies regardless of whether we choose loan treatment or section 1058 treatment for 
these transactions.  
69 NYSBA Report  
70 The NYSBA suggests a narrower reading of Anschutz. 
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at arriving at what should be the same results; the tax results should depend on the 
relevant policy considerations behind attribute assignment not the formal means 
of getting there. We would still recognize the interest component to the 
transaction and make the same attribute assignments. The main difference is that a 
section 1058 approach would treat the securities entitlement holder as the owner 
and recast the attributes in light of this default rule while the loan treatment would 
treat the original holder as the owner and recast the attributes in light of this 
approach.   
Non-traded assets – sale leasebacks.  
We close by briefly considering the treatment of nonfinancial assets under 
our proposal. Ownership has long been a vexing problem for depreciable assets 
because owners of such assets often want to assign depreciation to high-bracket 
taxpayers. Sale leasebacks are designed to achieve this. Indeed, it is not clear to 
what extent sale leasebacks would exist absent taxation.71 Determining when a 
sale-leaseback successfully transfers ownership is vexing question and the answer 
has varied over the years.72  
A complete discussion of sale-leasebacks would take us far afield. We 
limit ourselves to two comments. First, our approach of thinking of ownership as 
a default rule supplemented by attribute assignment rules should work in the sale-
leaseback context. We would treat the title holder as the owner but decide 
separately whether the conditions have been met for him to claim depreciation. 
We do this already to some extent under current law. For example, the passive 
activity loss rules and the at risk rules limit the attributes available to passive 
owners even if they are treated as owners for tax purposes.  
Second, Professors Noel Cunningham and Deborah Schenk recently 
proposed an approach to ownership in this context that at least on the surface 
appears at odds with our approach.73 They suggest finer grained division of 
ownership along with an accrual system designed to force recognition of time 
value of money returns. We view their approach as compatible with ours in the 
following sense: their approach moves the tax system closer to a Haig-Simons tax 
by forcing parties to recognize time value returns. By moving closer to a Haig-
Simons tax, they reduce the problems ownership creates, and this is perhaps one 
                                                 
71 The question would seem to be the extent to which sale-leasebacks provide nontax 
treatment not possible with secured loans. 
72 Frank Lyon, safe-harbor leasing. 
73 Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization, A 
“Revolutionary” Approach to Ownership, 47 Tax L. Rev. 725 (1992). 
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reason why their proposal is attractive. While we do not discuss ways to move 
financial products taxation closer to a Haig-Simons tax, to the extent the system 
moves in that direction, we suspect that ownership problems will be less 
important. 
4. Conclusion 
 Our key point is that ownership acts in the tax law as a default for attribute 
assignment and nothing more. Given the default rule, the particular attributes are 
then tailored for the policies that are behind each attribute. There is no reason to 
expect uniformity and in fact we do not see uniformity. In this context, we want 
the default rule to be simple and provide the correct attribute assignment for 
ordinary cases. Detailed examinations of the attributes of ownership, as we done 
in recent cases such as Calloway and Anschutz are not appropriate and only serve 
to muddle the role of ownership and make the law more complex than it needs to 
be.  
We propose using the Article 8 securities entitlement rules as the default 
ownership rule for fungible securities held in street name and title for other assets. 
This provides the correct and intuitive answer for ordinary cases such as simple 
purchases or sales of stock or debt and provides a clear and simple background 
rule for other cases so that the attribute assignment rules can be written with an 
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